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Through the lens of Merleau-Ponty: advancing the 
phenomenological approach to nursing research 
Sandra P. Thomas PhD RN FAAN 
University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, USA 
Abstract	 Phenomenology has proved to be a popular methodology for nursing 
research. I argue, however, that phenomenological nursing research 
could be strengthened by greater attention to its philosophical under­
pinnings. Many research reports devote more page space to procedure 
than to the philosophy that purportedly guided it. The philosophy of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is an excellent fit for nursing, although his work 
has received less attention than that of Husserl and Heidegger. In this 
paper, I examine the life and thought of Merleau-Ponty, with emphasis 
on concepts, such as perception, intentionality and embodiment, which 
have particular relevance to the discipline of nursing. 
Keywords: phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty, perception, intentionality, 
embodiment, nursing research. 
How remote from their clumsy pride was the task which 
they considered insignificant and left in dust and must - the 
task of description - although the subtlest fingers and senses 
can scarcely be subtle enough for it. (Friedrich Nietzsche) 
Phenomenological research methodology is devoted 
to that 'task of description' of which Nietzche spoke. 
When well written, the report of a phenomenological 
study can move readers to tears. Such a report can 
take clinicians into the Iifeworld of their patients in a 
deeper way, often producing astonishment as well as 
empathy and compassion. Nursing studies conducted 
from a phenomenological stance have yielded' com-
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pelling descriptions of the lived experience of diverse 
disease conditions (e.g. addiction, anorexia, arthritis, 
cancer) and symptoms (e,g. air hunger, chronic 
pain, urinary incontinence), as weU as more elusive 
phenomena such as courage and caring (Koch, 
1995; Carpenter et al., 1999). I argue, however, that 
phenomenological nursing research could be strength­
ened by greater attention to its philosophical under­
pinnings. The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
provides an excellent philosophical base for advancing 
nursing research, and I seek to kindle excitement 
about it among other scholars. I begin by describing 
my personal odyssey as a researcher. 
Discarding the	 mechanistic lens 
For much of modern nursin'g's history, medicine's 
mechanistic lens for seeing phenomena also was nurs­
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ing's lens. Patients' bodies were viewed as malfu­
nctioning machines and their complaints as problems 
to be solved using a linear hypothetico-deductive 
thought process. Likewise, nursing research pro­
ceeded from specifying a 'problem' to operationaliz­
ing discrete, measurable variables such as 'stress', to 
statistical testing of the null hypothesis (Thomas & 
Pollio, 2002). I became dissatisfied with this approach 
when my programme of research began to focus on 
women's stress and anger. For example, no question­
naire measures women's vicarious stress, which 
proved to be the stressor of greatest magnitude for 
women in a study by my research team (Thomas, 
1993). Study participants had completed a well­
validated and reliable stress instrument, but an open­
ended question ultimately revealed the shortcomings 
of this instrument. The open-ended question, added 
almost as an afterthought, permitted the women to 
describe their greatest distress in their own words. 
What most troubled my study participants were 
events happening to their significant others, such as 
the impending divorce of a son, job problems of a 
husband, illness of a sister or friend. In these stressful 
circumstances the women suffered empathically 
along with their loved ones but had little or no control 
over what was transpiring. Vicarious stress was not 
amenable to traditional stress management strategies 
directed toward marshalling personal resources and 
gaining mastery. It fuelled a chronic, impotent anger. 
I realized that the nature of this stress, and the con­
comitant anger, of these women would not have been 
revealed by any of the commonly utilized instru­
ments. To understand what they felt, I needed to 
plumb the complexities of their relational commit­
ments to partners, friends, and extended families. I 
needed to invite them to describe their experience in 
an unfettered manner, telling their stories of emo­
tional distress with all'the inherent messiness that 
cannot be neatly operationalized and factor-analysed. 
Experiences such as this led me to phenomenolog­
ical methodology. Before the ink was dry on my first 
book about women's anger (Thomas, 1993), based 
largely on quantitative research data, I had formed a 
new research team and plunged into phenomenolog­
ical i~vestigation. I was soon stunned by the realiza­
tion that the quantitative project had completely 
missed an essential dimension of women's anger 
experience: the intermingling of deep hurt with their 
anger. Women often said, 'I don't know if I'm more 
angry or hurt; I'm hurt and angry.' (Thomas et al., 
1998) The hurt emanated from violations of an 
implicit relational contract that women understood to 
be present between themselves and their significant 
others. What women expected was reciprocity in their 
close relationships. When others let them down, their 
emotional response was an amalgam of painful 
feelings - feelings that were often suppressed for 
fear of alienating intimates or causing relationship 
termination. These research findings had significant 
implications for extant cognitive-behavioural anger 
management interventions, none of which addressed 
these complexly interwoven aspects of women's 
anger. None of the 'valid and reliable' anger instru­
ments had permitted discovery of these findings. 
So I became a 'convert' to phenomenology, but well 
aware of my limitations and hungry for greater 
knowledge. Long a reader of existential philosophers 
such as Kierkegaard, Camus, and Sartre, I felt com­
fortable with existential tenets. But I had been 
trained solely as a quantitative researcher. What did 
I know about qualitative research methodology? 
What did I know about phenomenology? It is said 
that when the learner is ready, the teacher will 
appear. I had actually taken a course in existential 
phenomenology as a doctoral student and enjoyed 
my first dabbling in the work of Merleau-Ponty 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945), but at the time I was thor­
oughly captivated by beta weights, Bonferronis and 
significant Fs. As the years passed, sometimes I would 
see my teacher around campus. He would ask what I 
was studying, and he would gently suggest that phe­
nomenological interviews might be revelatory. 
Finally, I heard what he was saying. One day, 15 years 
after the first course, I enrolled in his class again, and 
Merleau-Ponty now made so much more sense. I 
experienced an epiphany. I was home. I have been 
immersed in existential phenomenology ever since, at 
first a mere novice in my professor's weekly research 
group, then a collaborator, and finally a coleader. Our 
interdisciplinary group has been meeting weekly for 
12 years now. There is something very special about 
our Tuesday afternoon meetings. About 15-20 faculty 
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and students from nursing, education, psychology, 
geography, exercise science and other disciplines 
gather together for the reading of phenomenological 
interview transcripts. Enthusiasm about our approach 
has been kindled in dozens of colleagues and stu­
dents, some of whom contributed to our 2002 book, 
Listening to Patients (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). 
Why choose phenomenology for the 
study of emotion? 
I contend that only within existential phenomenol­
ogy has emotion been given a central place in human 
existence (Heidegger, 1927; Sartre & Frechtman, 
1939). Earlier philosophies tended to view emotion 
as inferior to reason; being 'emotional' led to mis­
takes, madness and sin. Within existential phenome­
nology, the various forms of being emotional are 
viewed as diverse ways of being-in-the-world (Fis­
cher et ai., 1989), and the phenomenologist is inter­
ested in their meanings. Sartre was one of the first to 
offer an account of emotion, proposing that emotion 
is the way consciousness changes the world from 
deterministic to magical (Sartre, 1939). For example, 
an emotion like anger could be used strategically, to 
achieve one's ends when faced with the struggles and 
difficulties of a deterministic world. Emotions are 
gestalts that move us to action; they cannot be 
reduced to physiological alterations or motor 
behaviours (Sartre, 1939). Yet much contemporary 
research focuses on discrete aspects of emotion such 
as changes in facial musculature or neurotransmit­
ters. Pribram has commented on this trend, 'It was 
not so very long ago that I attended a symposium on 
"emotion" at an international congress in Madrid. 
The participants discussed factor analysis, limbic 
neuroanatomy, and operant conditioning. Some­
where in the agenda emotions were hidden from 
view, lurking in the dark alleys of our ignorance. No 
one even dared used the term' (Pribram et at., 1980, 
p. 246). It is time to uncover the meanings of anger, 
stress and depression from the first-person perspec­
tive of individuals experiencing these feelings. Per­
haps they have value and purpose. Existential 
phenomenology offers a way to engage in respectful 
dialogue with people and glean richly nuanced and 
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contextualized descriptions of their emotions. While 
other qualitative approaches employ a dialog~cal 
method, what is unique here is the specific philo­
sophical lens. 
Choosing the specific philosophical 
lens for the study of emotion 
To enable me to see emotional phenomena freshly, 
I chose a new lens derived from the philosophy 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). I 
liked his antireductionist and antipositivist stance. I 
liked his explicit rejection of Cartesian mind-b0dy 
dualism. He contended that the T which thinks is 
inseparable from his body and his lived situation; a 
person is an indissoluble unity. In contrast to Heideg­
ger, whose focus was on the abstract nature of being, 
Merleau-Ponty was concerned with a science of 
human beings (Cohen, 1987). The specific aim of his 
phenomenology was to give a direct description, not 
a causal explanation, of experience. Merleau-Ponty 
exhorted us to examine the immediacy of experience 
before it is objectified by science. He believed that 
true philosophy is relearning to see the world. Thus, 
he urged us to be astonished by the world, to see it 
with open and wondering eyes. 
Merleau-Ponty (1908-61) was a contemporary of 
philosophical luminaries such as Husserl, Sartre, 
and Heidegger. In early 20th century Europe, 
immersed in the horror of two world wars being 
fought in their own lands, it is not surprising that 
these German and French philosophers were grap­
pling with issues of anxiety, death, freedom, respon­
sibility and the very meaning of human existence. A 
remote and abstract philosophy could no longer be 
satisfying to them. Their personal experiences 
undoubtedly provided impetus for their philosophi­
cal musings. Thus, it is important to note that Mer­
leau-Ponty served in the French army in World War 
II and suffered imprisonment and torture by the 
Germans (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). Just as we must 
seek to understand the situational context of our 
research participants' - and patients' - experiences, 
so also we must consider the writings of phenome­
nological philosophers in light of the war-torn lifew­
orld into which they had been thrust. For that 
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reason, we will delve further into key events of 
Merleau-Ponty's life a bit later. 
Origins and evolution of 
phenomenology 
Phenomenology had origina ted in German philoso­
phy but soon gained adherents in other European 
countries such as France, Belgium and Holland. The 
historical evolution of the phenomenological move­
ment has been ably traced by others (Spiegelberg, 
1981; Cohen, 1987; Reeder, 1987). The movement has 
been characterized as a 'set of waves' (Reeder, 1987) 
in a vast groundswell of 'antireductionist and anticon­
structionist' thinking that had begun in the nine­
teenth century (Spiegelberg, 1981, p. xi). No unity was 
achieved within this European intellectual move­
ment, although there was a common aversion to the 
prevailing mechanistic research paradigm of the 
behaviourists. Much of the European work was 
unknown for some time in the English-speaking 
world, including that of Merleau-Ponty, whose work 
was first translated into English relatively recently in 
1962 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). 
Phenomenology in nursing 
Articles on phenomenology began to appear in the 
nursing literature in the 1970s, with early treatises by 
Paterson & Zderad (1976), Parse (1981), Oiler (1982) 
and Ornery (1983). Over the ensuing decades, phe­
nomenology has become quite popular. Although a 
number of nurses now call themselves phenomenol­
ogists, there is considerable diversity amongst us. 
According to Caelli (2000),18 different forms of phe­
nomenology have been identified. Dominant within 
nursing literature have been Husserlian phenomenol­
ogy, Heideggerian phenomenology and variants of 
the 'Dutch school'. What nurses in America, Australia 
and other western countries are doing today under 
the putative umbrella of phenomenology is very dif­
ferent from the solitary reflections of twentieth cen­
tury European philosophers. While Crotty (1996) 
accused contemporary nurse scholars of misinterpret­
ing. European phenomenological philosophy, Caelli 
(2000) contended that deliberate choices were made 
to develop new ways of applying phenomenological 
philosophy to inquiry. Drew (2001, p. 16), speaking of 
the legacy of Husserl's ideas, reminded us that it is 
the task of researchers to decide 'how ... philosophic 
ideas are put into action'. Silverman (1987, p. 6) com­
mended the new generation of American phenome­
nological researchers who are marking out 'clear and 
original paths'. But clarity regarding these 'paths' is 
lacking in many published reports of phenomenolog­
ical nursing research. To wit, the link between 
procedural aspects of a study and its philosophical 
underpinnings is often unclear to the reader. Despite 
the lip service paid to Husserl, Heidegger and other 
philosophers by nurse researchers, many reports of 
phenomenological research devote more page space 
to procedure than to the philosophy that purportedly 
guided it (Porter, 1998). There is no mention of 
the underlying philosophical perspective in some 
research reports. For example, a researcher may 
speak of using Colaizzi's 'steps' (Colaizzi et al., 1978), 
making no reference to the Husserlian inspiration for 
his analytic scheme. Especially popular within nurs­
ing has been this set of steps developed by Colaizzi, 
a psychology graduate student, while doing his 1973 
doctoral dissertation on learning at Duquesne 
(Colaizzi, 1973). Nursing's prolonged allegiance to 
Colaizzi is puzzling. Other than a book chapter in a 
1978 text by Valle and Halling (Colaizzi et al., 1978), 
I find no evidence that Colaizzi ever published any­
thing else. Apparently he did not remain active in 
phenomenological scholarship. 
Six years ago, Porter (1998, pp. 26, 27) called upon 
nurse scholars to 'demonstrate allegiance to our cho­
sen philosophies rather than adherence to proce­
dure'. She described her own experience of 'being 
inspired' by Husserl. I have been similarly inspired by 
the works of Merleau-Ponty. Elsewhere, with my 
mentor Howard Pollio, I have written about proce­
dural aspects of the phenomenological research 
method that was developed at the University of Ten­
nessee (Thomas & Pollio, 2002) and first introduced 
by Pollio et al. (1997). Here, I focus mainly on the 
philosophy that guides our work. I examine the life 
and thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, with empha­
sis on the material of particular relevance to my pro­
gramme of research and to the discipline of nursing. 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005 Nursing Philosophy, 6, pp. 63-76 
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My hope is that this introduction to the man and his 
ideas will stimulate other nurse scholars to seek addi­
tional information. We begin by examining biograph­
ical data regarding the key events and people who 
influenced his philosophy. 
A brief biography of Merleau-Ponty 
Curiously, given his international prominence, there 
is no book-length biography of Merleau-Ponty. The 
facts that follow were gleaned, bit by bit, from a 
variety of sources. Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born 
on the west coast of France in 1908. War touched 
his life early, as hjs father, an army officer, was 
killed in action during World War 1. Despite the loss 
of his father, his childhood, spent living with his 
mother and one sister, was said to be idyllic 
(McBride et al., 2001). He was educated in the 
French Iycee system and then studied philosophy at 
the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris, where he 
conducted postgraduate work on the nature of per­
ception and met Sartre, a profound influence on his 
life (Priest, 1998). The remainder of his life was 
spent as a teacher jn the Iycee system and in various 
universities. Along with Sartre and other French 
philosophers, he began his career studying the work 
of Husser! (Moran, 2000). He heard Husserl lecture 
in 1929 and later travelled to the Husserlian 
Archives to examine unpublished papers. Although 
he ultimately rejected certain aspects of Husserl's 
thought, he retained Husserl's descriptive approach 
to phenomena and combined it with an existential 
ground, deriving, in part, from Hejdegger (Thomas 
& Pollio, 2002). His existentialist ideas are also 
attributed to his close association with Sartre and 
Camus (Priest, 1998). The relationship with Sartre 
has been the topic of numerous essays. According 
to most accounts, the two men greatly enjoyed 
matching wits in long intellectual discussions. While 
in agreement about many points, Merleau-Ponty 
was more concerned with science than was Sartre 
(Cohen, 1987). 
Although some say that Merleau-Ponty was him­
self a behaviourist - having once uttered kind words 
about John Watson (Pollio et aI., 1997) - his first 
book took issue with behaviourism. In The Structure 
© Blackwell Publishing Lcd 2005 Nursing Philosophy, 6, pp. 63-76 
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of Behaviour (Merleau-Ponty, 1942), he asserted that 
no piece of behaviour may be reduced to its alle,ged 
parts. He pointed out the ambiguity of behaviour, 
contending that any behaviour may be given various 
interpretations from the perspective of the actor or 
the third person observer (Priest, 1998). Ambiguity 
was to become a continuing thread throughout his 
work, Later, he explained that ambiguity prevails 
both in perception and in self-knowledge. Tune itself 
is not an objective dimension of the world, but is 
ambiguous. 
In his most famous book, The Phenomenology of 
Perception (hereafter abbreviated as PP) (Merleau­
Ponty, 1945), Merleau-Ponty devoted painstaking 
attention to everyday human activities and situa­
tions. This focus was ilivergent from traditional phi­
losophy. In PP, he sought to refute both 
empiricism and what he called 'i'ntellectualism', 
willch is more commonly tenned idealism. Empiri­
cism is flawed because it ignores the subjective; 
intellectualism is flawed because tillngs are only 
understood intellectually, and the world' is reduced 
to ideas. In the words of Merleau-Ponty, 'empiri­
cism cannot see that we need to know what we are 
looking for, otherwise we would not be looking for 
it, and intellectualism fajls to see that we need to 
be ignorant of what we are looking for, or equally 
again we should not be searching' (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945, p. 28). We will have more to say about PP 
later. 
The outbreak of World War II disrupted Mer­
leau-Ponty's research and greatly afiected his view 
of freedom and other people. He concluded that 
everyone is compromised in war (Moran, 2000). In 
his role as a second lieutenant in the infantry, he 
was required to call for artillery barrages or ajr 
attacks on enemy positions. As noted earher, he 
was captured and tortured by the Germans. After 
the war, in Sense and Nonsense (Merleau-Ponty, 
1948), he wrote movingly of the changes in his val­
ues that ensued from these experiences. In Human­
ism and Terror, he wrote about what it means to 
be a collaborator, a traitor, or a revolutionary 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1947). In the early postwar years, 
he became involved in radicaI'politics. In 1945 Mer­
leau-Ponty and Sartre collaborated in founding a 
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journal. In Sartre's words, 'We [were] hunters of 
meaning, we would speak the truth about the world 
and about our own lives' (Moran, 2000, p. 397). 
Deploring capitalism's protection of privileged 
groups, the two philosophers sought answers in 
Marxism and Communism. But Merleau-Ponty 
began to view Sartre's support of Stalin with dis­
may. By 1952, significant differences between the 
two caused an acrimonious split, with Merleau­
Ponty resigning from the journal staff. One bone of 
contention was the journal's propensity for taking 
what Merleau-Ponty called 'on-the-fly' positions 
about political events. He felt that the journal 
should maintain a more philosophical tone, i.e. 'try 
to reach the reader's head rather than heart' (Belay 
& Davis, 2001, p. 42). The immediate impetus for 
Merleau-Ponty's resignation, however, was Sartre's 
stated intent to prevent the journal from publishing 
one of his essays. 
As Merleau-Ponty became increasingly disillu­
sioned with both Marxism and Communism, with­
drawing from the political fray, Sartre accused him of 
abdicating bis responsibility. Recently translated let­
ters are illuminating (Belay & Davis, 2001). In a 1953 
letter, Sartre chided: 'I blame you ... for abdicating 
in the midst of circumstances where you have to 
decide as a man, as French, as citizen, and as intellec­
tual - by taking your "philosophy" as an alibi' (Belay 
& Davis, 2001, p. 35). In his response, Merleau-Ponty 
asserted, 'I have' never wavered on my wish to do 
philosophy, and I told you so, one day around 1948, 
when you asked me why I did not give up 
teaching.... I have decided, since the Korean War, to 
stop writing on events as they happen' (Belay & 
Davis, 2001, p. 40). The split between the two men 
was emotionally painful for both, as shown in their 
1953 letters. Merleau-Ponty deplored the 'glacial 
tone' and 'irate tone' Sartre used when making com­
ments to· him about his recent lectures and essays. 
Sartre defended himself by saying, 'If I might have 
seemed glacial, it is because I have always had a sort 
of shyness when it comes to congratulating' (Belay & 
Davis, 2001, p. 56) and he admitted that 'I am 
unhappy that we disagree' (Belay & Davis, 2001, p. 
57). -Interested readers may want to seek out this 
exchange of letters between the two philosophers, 
which provide not only some insight into what Sartre 
called the 'emptying of the abscess' in their strained 
personal relationship (Belay & Davis, 2001, p. 55) but 
also a glimpse of the tensions in the world in the first 
phase of the Cold War. 
In 1953, at the age of 45. Merleau-Ponty achieved 
the distinction of being the youngest person ever to 
be elected the chair of philosophy at the College de 
France. During the 1950s he was rethinking much 
of his earlier work. According to Moran (2000), he 
had become especially interested in the problem of 
reciprocal relations and communications with oth­
ers (intersubjectivity). In his last book, The Visible 
and the Invisible, published posthumously, he 
showed a new interest in ontological questions, 
such as the 'subject-object question' (Merleau­
Ponty,1964). 
Dissatisfied with language that perpetuated dual­
ism and dichotomies, he introduced new terms, such 
as intertwining, which described the inseparability of 
subject from world, and chiasm, which described the 
'place in the flesh of the world where the visible flesh 
also sees, where the tangible flesh also touches, and 
so on.... TIlis only happens at the location in this 
fleshly element where there is a person. The sculpture 
does not feel or see itself or the other objects in the 
room around it. ... TIlliS, perception and sensation 
are a kind of doubling of the flesh of the world upon 
itself. One could think of it as the wave when it breaks 
and curls over. It is the place in the wave where the 
water touches itself' (Young & Davis, 2001, p. 114). 
Unfortunately, he did not complete this ambitious 
undertaking. Before his sudden death in 1961, he had 
finished only a few chapters of the book, although 
others were subsequently assembled from his notes. 
As McBride notes, 'I am sure that Merleau-Ponty's 
thought would have developed in exciting new 
directions ... that might well have complemented 
some of the new directions taken by Sartre during the 
years in which he outlived his former colleague' 
(McBride el al., 2001, p. 73). In my searches of the 
literature, I have not found a cause of death for Mer­
leau-Ponty.The event of his death is tinged with irony, 
as he collapsed while rereading Descartes in prepara­
tion for a class he was to deliver the next day (Priest, 
1998). He was only 53. 
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Key tenets of Merleau-Ponty's 
philosophy with relevance to 
nursing 
Perception 
The nurse researcher who works within the Merleau­
Ponty tradition seeks to discover study participants'/ 
patients' perceptions of their lived experience. Mer­
leau-Ponty's philosophy was first and always a phe­
nomenology of perception. He felt that traditional 
philosophy misunderstood the role of perception in 
the formation of awareness and experience. It is per­
ception that opens us to reality, providing a direct 
experience of the events, objects and phenomena of 
the world. 111is direct experience is to be contrasted 
with thinking and language, which deal with ideas and 
representations of the world (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). 
All knowledge takes place within the horizons 
opened up by perception, and all meaning occurs 
through perception. Perception is learned in an 
embodied, communal environment. Humans are 
born into a particular sociohistorical and cultural 
milieu, and immediately embedded in what Merleau­
Ponty called a 'knot of relations' that includes 'all 
those we have loved, detested, known or simply 
glimpsed' (Switzer & Davis, 2001, p. 283). 
As children grow, they readily absorb the norms 
and practices of their culture. Because of shared cul­
tural understandings, perception of a given entity can­
not be fully understood without knowing something 
of the specific culture. For example, a Japanese wife 
may express her anger toward her husband by creat­
ing a disorderly flower arrangement. The husband's 
ability to perceive the symbolic meaning of that 
flower arrangement is predicated on his understand­
ing of the culturally prescribed, precise way that 
flowers should be placed in their container and the 
proscription against direct expression of a disruptive 
emotion such as anger in Japanese society. An Amer­
ican husband seeing the same flowers would not per­
ceive them in the same way. 
Phenomena appear to us as meaningful wholes. But 
perceived things, according to Merleau-Ponty, are 
always perceived as having a certain figure or form 
against a background (Moran, 2000). To explain this 
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005 Nursing Philosophy, 6, pp. 63-76 
principle, the familiar black-and-white illustration of 
the vase and two faces is often used, in which a focus 
on the white portion reveals the vase and a focus on 
the black portions on each side reveals two faces 
confronting one another (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). 
Similarly, figure and ground cocreate each other in 
human experiences: 'There are no figures by them­
selves: All figural aspects of (perceptual) experience 
emerge against some ground that serves to delineate 
its specific experiential form' (Pollio eta!., 1997, p. 
13). What stands out as figural or focal to a person 
cannot be fully understood without consideration of 
many different existential grounds. Thus, we must 
consider the major grounds: Body, Time, Other Peo­
ple, and World (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). Our research 
method seeks a complete and careful description of 
both the figural and background aspects of the phe­
nomenon we are investigating. The emotion of anger, 
for example, cannot be understood without a grasp of 
both its relational and cultural context. It is an intense 
bodily experience as well. It is important to note, 
however. that the researcher does not use a struc­
tured interview protocol to probe for these contexts; 
instead, the angry person is asked, 'What aspects of 
the experience stand out to you?' 
The interviewee's narrative reveals what is figural 
to him. The bodily aspects of a phenomenon may 
compel the attention of some respondents while 
other aspects of the experience, such as Time or 
World, may be indistinct or fuzzy. In. a study of 
chronic pain, for example, patients seldom talked 
about the World (Thomas, 2000). Pain had impris­
oned them, creating separation from the world. They 
used terms such as locked off, roped offand caged off 
to depict this imprisonment that created distance 
from other people and the world. As one participant 
explained, 'I feel like I'm on this island all by myself' 
(Thomas, 2000, p. 692). 
Figure and ground may 'change places' many times 
during repeated experiences of a phenomenon. In the 
aforementioned study of chronic pain, searing pain 
was sometimes figural, obliterating a patient's aware­
ness of everything but the hurting body (Thomas, 
2000). On other occasions, the pain receded to a dull 
ache; although constant, it did not dominate con­
sciousness (i.e. was no longer figural). As the body 
70 Sandra P. Thomas 
became 'ground', the individual could emerge from 
the isolation of the pain, go out into the world and 
connect with other people again. 
Intentionality 
The literature indicates some confusion with the term 
intentionality as Merleau-Ponty used it. 
What he was referring to was not plans or planning, 
as in common parlance, but relatedness to the world, 
the integral interconnectedness between humans and 
the lifeworld in which attention of humans is always 
directed toward specific events, objects and phenom­
ena (Thomas & Pollio, 2002). We are never simply 
passive before the stimuli in the lifeworld. We are 
engaged 'receptors' of stimuli. All experience takes 
place in relation to something other than itself. 
'Understanding the meaning of some experience 
requires us to describe the intentional stance (or sit­
uated perspective) of the event from the point of view 
of the experiencing person' (Pollio et al., 1997, p. 8). 
Thomas & Pollio (2002, p. 14) provide a maxim to 
help researchers grasp the concept of intentionality: 
'What I am aware of reveals what is meaningful to 
me. If, for example, I enter a room and notice only 
the furniture, I probably am a very different person 
from someone else who enters the room and notices 
only the children, the food, or the artwork.' Drew 
(2001) recommends that researchers consider our 
own intentionality (i.e. what we find meaningful, how 
we are connected to the topics that we study). We 
accomplish this through the process of bracketing 
(Thomas & Pollio, 2002), although Merleau-Ponty 
reminds that it is not possible to completely bracket 
all of our personal interests, assumptions and presup­
positions. Bracketing is an ongoing process through­
out the course of a study. 
Embodiment 
Of Merleau-Ponty's concepts, embodiment has 
attracted the most attention from nurse scholars. 
'Merleau-Ponty is possibly the single philosopher who 
has done the most to draw our attention to the per­
vasive importance of embodiment' (Young & Davis, 
2001, p. 101). As MacQuarrie (1973, p. 93) notes, 
'The reason for the neglect of the body in philosophy lies 
deep in the tradition of Western thought ... From Plato to 
Descartes and modern idealism, the belief has been that the 
true self or the real man is somehow within, and that the 
body is an appendage or a framework of some sort'. 
Descartes argued that 
'being able to think constitutes our essence; ... that the 
mind is disembodied; and ... therefore, that the essence of 
human beings, that which makes us human, has nothing to 
do with our bodies' (Lakoff & Johnson. 1999, p. 400). 
According to Lakoff & Johnson (1999), these Car­
tesian tenets influenced not only philosophy but edu­
cation and popular culture, leading to the dissociation 
of reason from emotion and the downplaying and 
devaluing of emotional life. Much of the contempo­
rary anger management literature exhorts readers to 
employ rational thought to control - even banish ­
the emotion of anger. Anger is branded as dangerous 
and irrational, especially for women. If enacted, this 
advice would require us to ignore the wisdom of the 
angry body. But anger is generated by significant vio­
lations of beliefs, values, or rights. The body's arousal 
is powerful, a call to movement and to words that will 
protect one's boundaries and defend one's rights. 
When silenced, the angry body remains in turmoil. 
Women in our study used terms such as simmering, 
stewing and festering to describe the agitation pro­
duced by anger. As noted by one research participant, 
the body hurts when anger is suppressed: 'I can tell if 
I hold anger for a while my anger takes the form 
of stress in my neck it's hidden but my body 
knows' (Thomas et al., 1998, p. 315). The suppressed 
anger builds over time in the body. One woman used 
the metaphor of 'a big ball' to describe its accumula­
tion: 'It's like you build up so much anger 
inside ... without really sitting down and talking 
about the problem that it just rolls up into a big ball 
and you're not even sure what it's really about' (Tho­
mas et al., 1998, p. 316). Study participants described 
a sense of powerlessness when they did not express 
their anger but confined it within the body. Our 
research suggests that instead of stifling anger. 
women must acknowledge the wisdom of their bodies 
and act on their anger to achieve conditions of justice 
and equity (Thomas et al., 1998). 
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To return to the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty, the 
human body is not an appendage or a thing in the 
Cartesian sense. The body is the fundamental cate­
gory of human existence; it exists before there is 
thought (Pollio ec at., 1997). The body is, of course, 
the unwavering vantage point of perception. The 
body, however, not only perceives but also gestures 
and speaks. It moves through a world of objects that 
it can use for its various purposes. The body conveys 
qualities of objects, such as their weight. It gives 
meaning to the space around itself. As the body 
grows, the meaning of space becomes modified. What 
is high for a child is no longer high for an adult. 
Of particular relevance to nurses is Merleau­
Ponty's distinction between the 'body object', the 
body of medicine, and the 'lived body' or 'body sub­
ject', the body of personal experience. It is not sur­
prising that medical students come to perceive the 
body as 'object', because they begin learning about it 
through dissection of cadavers. Watson (1999) relates 
that one medical school professor actually introduced 
his students to the human body by writing 'dead 
mammal' on the blackboard the first day of class. In 
contrast to this dehumanizing and objectifying stance, 
Merleau-Ponty reminds us of the sacredness of the 
body. If we view the body as sacred, 'it [is] impossible 
for us to treat a face or a body, even a dead body, like 
a thing. They are sacred entities' (Moran, 2000, p. 
415). 
When the relationship between body and world is 
disturbed, a person's existence is profoundly shaken. 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this throughout PP with 
accounts of injured, disabled people, such as 
Schneider, who can no longer organize their world 
(Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1945). Schneider, a World 
War I veteran, is unable to make certain arm move­
ments in the research laboratory because of his 
wounds. However, he is able to move his arm while 
doing factory work. Merleau-Ponty takes the reader 
through a penetrating analysis of this paradox, show­
ing that neither a rationalist nor an empiricist expla­
nation will suffice. Merleau-Ponty's insights about the 
body are of great significance both to philosophy, 
which has been slow to devote attention to the body, 
and to nursing, which has intimate knowledge of the 
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impaired body but seldom pauses for philosophical 
reflection about it. 
Relationships with other people: the 'knot of 
relations' 
Many existential philosophers seemed to have a 
rather dark view of humanity, espousing individual­
ism and writing disparagingly of the 'crowd, the herd, 
the mass' (MacQuarrie, 1973, p. 122). In contrast, 
Merleau-Ponty saw the benefits of connecting with 
other people. He reminded us that newborn infants 
are first orientated toward their mother's face, not 
toward objects in the world; the first 'objects' the 
infant sees are smiles (Moran, 2000). Life thereafter 
is spent in a 'knot' or network of relations. When 
referring to the Other, Merleau-Ponty used terms 
such as 'my double' or 'my twin', indicating an egali­
tarian stance. Unlike Sartre, who saw in the social 
world the potential for conflict 'epitomized in the 
sweaty, mundane, empirically describable boxing 
match' (McBride et at., 2001, p. 82), Merleau-Ponty 
saw the potential for dialogue, through which persons 
receive recognition and affirmation. Unlike Heideg­
gel', who warned that other people distract from the 
pursuit of authentic being, Merleau-Ponty did not see 
others as impediments, rather as fellow travellers in 
life's journey (Pollio et aI., 1997). He spoke of the 
intersections of his path, and the path of other people: 
'my own and other people's [paths] intersect and 
engage each other like gears' (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 
p. xx). Recently, the daily intersections of nurses and 
patients have commanded the interest of several 
members of our phenomenological research team 
and revealed some surprising - and disturbing ­
findings. 
In one study, hospitalized patients longed for 
deeper connection with nurses and other caregivers, 
but more often they experienced disconnectedness. 
For example, a study participant commented on the 
timing and irrelevance of questions by a nurse when 
the participant was in active labour. The nurse, 
focused on her task of filling in all the blanks on an 
assessment form, was not attuned to the figural 
aspect of the patient's experience (her uterine 
contractions): 
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She stood on that side at one point during my labour and 
was asking me questions. And it was like, 'Have you had any 
stress in your life?' I'm having a baby! I think she meant 
have you moved recently or changed jobs, blah, blah, blah. 
It was funny, she would ask me questions, and I would be in 
the middle of a contraction and I'd say 'Can I answer that 
in a minute?' (Shattell, 2002, p. 225) 
In this interaction between nurse and patient, com­
mon ground was not achieved. Dialogue, as described 
by Merleau-Ponty, did not take place. Merleau-Ponty 
asserted that 'In the experience of dialogue, there is 
constituted between the other person and myself a 
common ground; my thought and his are interwoven 
into a single fabric.... We have here a dual being, 
where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of 
behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we 
are collaborators for each other in consummate reci­
procity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and 
we coexist through a common world' (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945, p. 354). 
In contrast to the disconnectedness in the previous 
vignette, Benner (2001, p. 68) shared an example in 
which the nurse, despite her patient's initial belliger­
ence, did persist in gaining the patient's trust and 
engaging her in dialogue: 
I was making my rounds. And I walked in and I said, 'Hi, 
I'm Sue. You must be Ann' And she said, 'What the hell is 
it to you? I'm so goddamned mad.' I ... said, 'Well, why 
don't you tell me about it?' I knew trom the beginning that 
there was such pain under her vile language - such intensity, 
almost agony. And I didn't even know her history. I didn't 
know anything about her ... and over the next month I 
found out about the agony and the pain. 
These phenomenological studies provide brief but 
fascinating glimpses of the intersecting paths of 
nurses and patients. Further studies of the relational 
aspects of nursing care would be especially timely, 
given the emphasis on speedy execution of tasks in 
today's profit-driven health care delivery system. 
Current nursing literature is replete with articles 
about weary nurses burning out and frightened 
patients feeling abandoned. Much remains to be 
learned about the meaning-laden situations in which 
nurses and patients meet one another and establish a 
dialogic connection - or fail to do so. 
Time 
Earlier, we made reference to the ambiguity of Time 
in Merleau-Ponty's writings. Time is a subjective 
experience, not 'a system of objective positions 
through which we pass but a mobile setting that 
moves toward and away from us' (Pollio et ai., 1997, 
p. 160). Awareness of time depends on events that 
happen; events are subjective, not objective (Priest, 
1998). Merleau-Ponty spoke of the 'bursting forth' of 
time - by analogy with a flowering plant bursting 
from its pod. In much of everyday life, minutes and 
hours pass mindlessly; Time only periodically bursts 
into consciousness. For example, a patient hearing a 
physician pronounce the diagnosis of terminal cancer 
may have a sudden awareness of the brevity of the 
life span. From that point on, he may engage in a 
frantic struggle to 'make the most' of his remaining 
days or months. He may be acutely aware of the 
choices and limits inherent in this quantity of time. 
His focus may shift to a pain-free hour, or a few 
moments in the sunshine, and it is often the nurse who 
provides these comforts during the terminal illness. 
The unit of time most salient to Merleau-Ponty is the 
present. In a letter to Sartre, he explicated the differ­
ences between the two philosophers' views of time: 
'You have a facility to construct and inhabit the future 
that is all yours. I tend to live in the present, leaving 
it undecidable and open, as it is.... My relationship 
with time happens mostly through the present' (Belay 
& Davis. 2001, p. 48). 
Morality 
One can find pervasive references to ambiguity in 
Merleau-Ponty's work, suggesting that his philosophy 
could provide no guidance regarding the Truth or the 
Good. However, he once defined true morality as 
'actively being what we are by chance, establishing 
that communication with others and with ourselves 
for which our temporal structure gives us the oppor­
tunity and of which our liberty is only the rough out­
line' (Watson & Davis, 2001, p. 201). I find this an 
astute guide for a moral and meaningful life. I find it 
directly pertinent to the daily practices of nurses in 
their local situations, wherever they may be. 
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I also find a distinctly moral tone in works such as 
Humanism and Terror (Merleau-Ponty, 1947), in 
which Merleau-Ponty pointed out the hypOCIisy of 
democracy, noting that societies proclaiming respect 
for autonomy, dignity and property rights 'were 
themselves created by violent conquests and 
insurrections ... and maintained by ongoing violence 
against exploited classes on foreign soils' (Young & 
Davis, 2001, p. 129). 
Merleau-Ponty deplored all such violence, envi­
sioning a humane social world in which dialogue 
would take priority over violence (Madison & Davis, 
2001). As Madison has pointed out, Merleau-Ponty 
was an early critic of totalitarianism - two decades 
before that position became fashionable in France ­
instead espousing a politics of 'mutual recognition 
and solidarity [that] was in fact the direct anticipation 
of the politics of civility championed in our times by 
VacJav Havel' (Madison & Davis, 2001, p. 174). 
Assessment of Merleau-Ponty's 
contribution 
If one is trying to pin down Merleau-Ponty, the task 
is much like the proverbial impossibility of nailing 
down jello. He rejects both historical determinism 
and absolute freedom. He rejects relativism and dog­
matism as well. He rejects both realism and idealism. 
He tells us that meaning is ambiguous, mixed up 
with nonmeaning. In his opinion, no amount of 
investigation can dispel the ambiguity of the myster­
ies of nature, the world, or God. This stance may 
create discomfort in nurses who wish to have 'right 
answers' to their questions. On the other hand, how 
exciting it can be to thoughtfully consider diverse 
interpretations of clinical or research data, remain­
ing open to the possibility of truly novel ways of 
perceiving the familiar. Adherents to the Merleau­
Ponty view of human existence must approach the 
study participant/patient from the humble stance of 
perpetual learner, not authority figure. With a humil­
ity uncharacteristic of academics, Merleau-Ponty 
referred to himself as the 'philosopher who does not 
know'. Whereas Husser! wanted to reduce scientific 
phenomena to their foundational prescientific 
essence, Mer!eau-Ponty believed that the original 
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phenomena lie buried in darkness in such a way that 
they cannot be brought to light - although .we can 
always erect pointers in the darkness. Our task as 
nurse researchers, then, is to erect these pointers. 
Porter (2000) likens the phenomenological resear­
cher to a heliograph, a device for sending messages 
or signalling by flashing the sun's rays from a mirror. 
By sending participants' messages to practising 
nurses, the researcher enables nurses to vicariously 
experience the lifeworld of patients with conditions 
such as chronic pain. 
Many scholars, both within and outside philosophy, 
are discovering, or rediscovering, the work of Mer­
leau-Ponty (Priest, 1998; Wilde, 1999; Benner, 2000; 
Moran, 2000; Davis, 2001) Some speculate that he 
never received the public attention accorded his con­
temporaries because of his retiring personality and 
difficult language (Moran, 2000). Priest (1998, p. 224) 
judged him to possess 'neither the literary talent nor 
the political dexterity of Sartre'. Nor does it seem that 
he exhibited the charisma of Heidegger. Interestingly, 
given his emphasis on description of lived experience, 
he remained noncommunicative about his own life, 
revealing little about himself (Davis, 2001). For a 
time, his work was unfashionable in French intellec­
tual circles, although now he is viewed more favour­
ably: He is actually considered to have pre-empted 
some aspects of postmodern thought. Derrida, among 
others, urges reassessing Merleau-Ponty's work 
(Davis, 2001). 
Perhaps it should not be surprising that it took a 
while for American scholars to develop appreciation 
of Merleau-Ponty's work, because of the time lag 
before many of his writings were translated. By the 
time PP was translated into English in 1962, Merleau­
Panty was already deceased. English translations of 
other books, such as Signs, Prose of the World and 
The Visible and the Invisible (Merleau-Ponty & 
Lingis, 1964; Merleau-Ponty & McCleary, 1964; Mer­
leau-Ponty & Lefort, 1973), appeared even later. 
Lakoff & Johnson (1999, p. xi), in their recent book 
Philosophy in the Flesh, paid special tribute both to 
Merleau-Ponty and John Dewey: 'Any book with the 
words "philosophy" and "flesh" in the title must 
express its obvious debt'· to Maurice Merleau­
Ponty ... For their day, Dewey and Merleau-Ponty 
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were models of what we will refer to as "empirically 
responsible philosophers" '. 
Wilde (1999) noted ·that scholars from nursing, 
medicine, anthropology, education, psychology and 
sociology have been exploring embodiment as a new 
area for theory development. She predicted that 
phenomenological nursing research will reveal the 
embodied practices that enable the chronically ill to 
surmount the challenges of living with limitations and 
assistive technologies. I believe this potential already 
has been demonstrated in Wilde's (1999) study of 
individuals requiring long-term urinary catheteriza­
tion and in recent phenomenological studies of 
ventilator-dependent children (Sarvey, 2001) and 
patients whose bodies have incorporated implanted 
defibrillators (Krau, 2002). In their day-by-day navi­
gation of the lifeworld, such patients have acquired 
valuable knowledge and innovative skills for coping. 
As we tap the wisdom of their bodies, by asking them 
to describe their everyday embodied existence, we 
can generate new middle-range theories and nursing 
interventions to help other chronically ill patients 
manage tbeir conditions (Wilde, 1999). Likewise, 
phenomenological studies of emotions such as anger 
are revealing the intelligence of emotions, thereby 
mandating a new stance on traditional therapeutic 
approaches that seek to medicate or banish them. 
Conclusion 
In writing this paper, I was once again reminded of 
the truth of Merleau-Ponty's observation that 'writers 
experience the excess of what is to be said beyond 
their ordinary capacities' (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 
57). 
A sense of urgency drove me to put these words on 
paper at a time wben my understanding is still incom­
plete. But, of course, my understanding will always be 
incomplete. I urge others to join the rejuvenated dia­
logue about the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Clearly, I believe tbat the ideas of Merleau-Ponty 
have abundant potential to advance nursing research. 
But phenomenology is not just for researchers. I 
believe that ali nurses can practise it as 'a manner or 
style .of thinking' (Merleau-Ponty & Smith, 1945, p. 
viii), learning to listen to patient concerns in a new 
way, alert to what is figural in the perceptions of their 
patients yet ever-mindful of their embeddedness in a 
particular sociocultural context. Being invited by a 
nurse to tell one's story surely benefits the patient, 
who often feels lost and alone in the juggernaut of the 
health care assembly line. Hearing the story enriches 
the nurse as well, filling him or her with awe regarding 
both the particularistic and the universal dimensions 
of human lived experiences of health and illness. 1 
find that phenomenology is transformational for 
those who practise it. 
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